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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Vernon E. Bush 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
COMMERCE PROPERTIES, INC. a 
corporation, and RICHARD C. 
BENNION, 
Defendants and Appellants 
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PROCESS INSTRUMENTS & CONTROL, 
INC., and JOHN A. HALL 
Defendants and Respondents 
Supreme Court 
No. 880100 
Court of Appeals 
No. 880254-CA 
District Court 
No. C87-1224 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
DISPOSITIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 11. The record on appeal. 
(a) Composition of record on appeal. The original papers 
and exhibits filed in the court from which the appeal is taken, the 
transcript of proceedings, if any, and the index prepared by the clerk of 
that court shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases. However, 
with respect to papers and exhibits, only those prescribed under Paragraph (d) of this rule shall be transmitted to the Court of Appeals. 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of appellant. The brief of the appellant shall 
contain under appropriate headings and in the order here indicated: 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first 
indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its 
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disposition in the court below. There shall follows a statement of the 
facts relevant to the issues presented for review. All statements of fact 
and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to 
the record (See Paragraph (3)). 
"Rule 52. Findings by the Court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury 
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall 
be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. 
Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the 
court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It 
will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the 
evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by 
the court, t he trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 
41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of 
the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 
50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one 
ground. 
"25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written 
and subscribed. In the following cases every agreement 
shall be void unless such agreement, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party to 
be charged therewith 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be 
performed within one year from the making thereof. (2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or 
miscarriage of another...." 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
a. Appellants properly cited the record in support of their appeal. 
b. Vernon E. Bush failed in its burden of proof to establish on the 
record that Richard C. Bennion acted in his individual capacity and was 
personally liable for payment of the architectural drawings in question. 
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c. Vernon E. Bush mis-applied the facts with respect to the Statute 
of Frauds, 70A-2-202, and 25-5-4, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
d. Plaintiff/Respondent's claim for attorney's fees is frivolous in 
view of the Supreme Court's previous denial of the same motion to 
dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
APPELLANTS PROPERLY CITED THE RECORD 
WHICH SUPPORTS THEIR APPEAL 
Under Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the brief of 
the appellant shall contain a statement of facts relevant to the issues 
presented for review which shall be supported by citations to the record 
(emphasis added). Rule 24(a)(7) states: 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of appellant. The brief of the appellant shall 
contain under appropriate headings and in the order here indicated: 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first 
indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its 
disposition in the court below. There shall follows a statement of the 
facts relevant to the issues presented for review. All statements of fact 
and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to 
the record (See Paragraph (3)). 
The record on appeal constitutes the original papers and exhibits filed 
in the court, the transcript of proceedings, and the index prepared by the 
clerk, according to Rule 11 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. The 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are therefore part of the Record, 
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and can be referenced by appellants to support their statement of facts in 
their brief. Rule 11 states: 
Rule 11. The record on appeal. (a) Composition of record on appeal. The original 
papers and exhibits filed in the court from which the appeal is 
taken, the transcript of proceedings, if any, and the index 
prepared by the clerk of that court shall constitute the record 
on appeal in all cases. However, with respect to papers and 
exhibits, only those prescribed under Paragraph (d) of this rule 
shall be transmitted to the Court of Appeals. 
Appellants therefore properly cited the transcript as well as the 
record below by referring to the court's findings of fact to support their 
statement of facts in their brief with respect to the establishment of the 
joint venture. Where the evidence was disputed, the findings of fact are 
the only proper way to reference the record. Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure States: 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
"(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without 
a jury.......... 
........... the court shall find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law thereon Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous 
Contrary to the representations in Plaintiff/Respondent's brief, 
Appellants are not challenging the findings of fact which established the 
90/10 joint venture. Appellants are challenging the conclusions of law 
with respect to 50% liability for the drawings, which conflict with the 
court's findings in this regard. 
Appellants therefore properly cited the record in support of their 
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statement of facts in support of their appeal. 
POINT TWO 
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT BUSH DID NOT MEET HIS BURDEN OF PROOF 
ESTABLISHING RICHARD C. BENNION'S PERSONAL LIABILITY 
Vernon Bush had the burden of proof to establish at trial that Richard 
C. Bennion was personally liable for payment for his architectural 
drawings. No evidence was presented in this regard, hence appellants did 
not cite in their brief any pages in the record to support these findings. 
Nor has respondent counsel pointed out any statements or writings in the 
record where Richard C. Bennion specifically told defendant that he was 
ordering the drawings on his own behalf. The April and May 1985 
invoices upon which counsel relies are appended to Vernon E. Bush's brief 
and show that Vernon E. Bush invoiced Commerce Properties, Inc. The 
appended February 1, 1987 Bush invoice shows Vernon E. Bush invoiced 
P.I.C., Inc. 
The undisputed testimony showed that Vernon Bush prepared 
customized drawings for John Hall's use. There simply was no evidence 
presented at trial establishing Richard C. Bennion at any time was acting 
in an individual capacity, and therefore the personal judgment entered 
against him was in error. Respondent's counsel is attempting to shift 
Vernon Bush's burden of proof onto Richard C. Bennion in this regard. 
Commerce Properties, Inc. is a real estate brokerage firm incorporated and 
licensed to do business in the State of Utah. All the documentary 
evidence indicated that Commerce Properties, Inc. was retained as project 
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manager, and was to receive a 10% contingent commission if the PIC 
Building was constructed. 
There was no oral evidence which established that Richard C. Bennion 
was the alter ego of Commerce Properties, Inc., or that he was acting in an 
individual capacity. The findings and judgment against Richard C. Bennion, 
individually, were therefore entered without any support on the record, 
and should be set aside as being clearly erroneous; under the Harker vs. 
Condominiums Forest Glen, Inc., 740 P.2d 1361 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
POINT THREE 
VERNON E. BUSH MIS-APPLIED THE FACTS WITH RESPECT TO THE STATUTE 
OF FRAUDS. 70A-2-202. AND 25-5-4. U.C.A.. 1953. AS AMENDED 
Vernon E. Bush brought this action for compensation for the 
preparation of certain custom designed plans and specifications for the 
the PIC building. Appellants contend that a writing was needed to bind 
them for any obligations to pay for these drawings and written 
specifications under Sec. 70A-2-202, and 25-5-4, U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended. It is appellant's position that these drawings constitute "goods" 
within the definition of 70A-2-202, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, where Mr. 
Bush did not agree to supervise or guarantee the construction of the PIC 
building, but only agreed to deliver the plans and specifications for a fixed 
price of $13,000.00. Vernon Bush provided a fixed price for the drawings: 
A. I am not aware of anything that we haven't discussed. I told them 
that I would do the drawings, the working drawings for the $13.000. and I 
fully expected to visit the project on--at pertinent times during 
construction, both to protect my liability and to assure compliance. 
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Q. So the total services for architectural on this project was 
$13,000? 
A. I told them that I would do the drawings for $13.000. 
Q. How much would you charge for the balance of the work? 
A. About $500. 
Q. That's to include the liability of supervising the project engineer? 
A. I would not supervise the project. That's not something I am 
willing to take liability on. That's the contractor's prerogative. But I 
would stop by, visit the project at pertinent times during the construction 
to verify that the requirement of the drawings and specifications were 
being met pertinent to structural and code requirements. (TR. 60) 
The Utah Supreme Court has not addressed the definition of "goods" 
within the definition of 70A-2-201, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. Nor have 
the courts nationwide adopted any uniform definitions. Although 
"services" are generally excluded from coverage under the UCC §2-201, 
special situations arise in the application of UCC §2-201, because the 
distinction between what are and what are not goods is not always clear 
and precise. Indeed, where a hybrid contract that involves both the 
supplying of goods and the rendition of services is involved numerous 
problems arise as to whether a contract is required. The "predominant 
focus test" referred to in respondent's brief is only one of many tests 
applied. In Colorado Carpet Installation, Inc. vs. Palermo (Colo) 668 P.2d 
1384, 36 UCCRS 1516m the court adopted the standard where the contract 
involves both the sale of carpet and the rendering of installation services, 
the classification according to its dominant element or primary purpose. 
The court then held that the contract was the sale of goods, inasmuch as 
the carpet was movable, the ratio of the cost of the carpet exceeded the 
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installation costs. 
There is a split of authority as to whether construction contracts 
involving the design and construction of a facility constitutes a 
transaction in goods within the scope of UCC Article 2. In Omaha Pollution 
Control Corp. vs. Carver-Greenfield Corp. (1976, DC Neb) 413 F.Supp 1069 
(applying Nebraska law), an action arising out of a contractor's agreement 
to design, construct, and deliver a sewage processing plant, the court 
stated that the case could best be resolved by treating it as a sale of 
goods under the UCC. The court noted that the buyer relied on the seller's 
expertise to recommend, design, and manufacture a product which would 
produce a marketable product from sewage. 
In Worrell vs. Barnes (1971) 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573, 9 UCCRS 76, 
an action against a contractor for fire damage to a house allegedly caused 
by a defective gas fitting installed by the contractor as part of 
remodelling work, the court stated that the case involved goods within the 
purview of UCC §2-105. 
Space Leasing Associates vs. Atlantic Bldg. Systems, Inc. (1977) 144 
Ga App. 320, 241 SE2d 438, 23 UCCRS 642, was an action arising out of a 
subcontract involving a portion of the construction of a warehouse and 
office complex for damages allegedly caused by a defective roof. Noting 
that the contract was entitled "Contract for Sale and Erection of Disisteel 
building(s), the court, citing UCC §§2-102 and 2-105(1), stated that 
whether the UCC Article 2 statute of limitations was applicable presented 
a question of act as to whether the subject of the transaction was 
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movable. 
It is Appellant's position that where Vernon Bush was only retained to 
provide custom designed architectural drawings and written bid 
specifications for the PIC building, these drawings and specifications 
constitute "goods" within the definition of Sec. 70A-2-201, U.C.A., 1953, 
as amended. This is particularly the case where Vernon E. Bush's 
drawings cost $13,000.00, and his supervisory services were only to cost 
$500.00. The drawings and specifications were separate and distinct and 
readily movable as evidenced by John Hall's delivery of them for altering 
by another contractor, Vernon Felt (T.R. 118). 
Q. In your deposition you indicated you paid Mr. Felt approximately 
$500 for design changes-
A. That's correct. 
Q. - is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Under Sec. 70A-2-201, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, except as otherwise 
provided in this section, a contract for the sale of goods for the price of 
$500.00 or more (the $13,000.00 Bush drawings and specifications for the 
PIC Building) is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there 
is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been 
made between the parties and signed by the party against whom 
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. 
Nothing in the Earnest Money Agreement appended to the Bush brief as 
Exhibit A shows that Commerce Properties, Inc. agreed to purchase these 
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plans and specifications from Vernon E. Bush. Nor does the building cost 
breakdown, Exhibit D-12 appended to the Bush brief, establish that 
Commerce Properties, Inc. agreed to pay for architectural services. 
Exhibit D-12 was the cost breakdown included in John Hall's financing 
package, wherein he applied to the SBA for funding to build the building 
and pay for the Vernon E. Bush's drawings. 
Sec. 70A-2-201, U.C.A., I953, as amended, was enacted to avoid the 
type of problems created by Vernon E. Bush's failure to enter into a 
written contract before he started the drawings. Respondents Hall and 
PIC for whom the plans and specifications were prepared have admitted 
liability, and have not cross-appealed. Third parties should not be held 
liable by implication, where there was no evidence presented that 
Commerce Properties, Inc. specifically agreed to pay Vernon E. Bush for 
the plans and specifications. 
Liability for payment of the plans and specifications, must lie under 
the exceptions outlined in Sec. 70A-2-201(3): (a) production of custom 
designed goods for the benefit of the party to be bound , (b) admissions in 
the pleadings or on the record that a contract for sale was made, and (c) 
receipt and acceptance of the goods by the party to be bound. As outlined 
in appellant's brief, none of these exceptions apply. 
Nor was there any writing where Commerce Properties, Inc. agreed to 
answer to the Bush debt incurred by Process Instruments & Control, Inc. as 
required under Sec. 25-5-4(2), U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
Recovery against Process Instruments & Control, Inc. can therefore 
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only be had under a quantum meruit or theory of unjust enrichment; see 
Baugh vs. Darly (1947) 112 U. 1, 184 P.2d 335. As Commerce Properties, 
Inc. received no benefit from these custom designed plans prepared for 
Process Instruments & Control, Inc. and used for their building loan 
application, Process Instruments & Control, Inc. should pay for the 
drawings; especially where it arbitrarily elected to drop the loan 
application after the same was approved. Process Instruments & Control 
has not cross-appealed, and has accepted liability in this case. Therefore, 
John Bush should proceed against them for any relief. 
In summary, the judgment entered against Commerce Properties, Inc. 
violated the provisions of Sec. 70A-2-201, and 25-5-4(2), U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended. 
POINT FOUR 
VERNON E. BUSH'S CLAIM FOR ATTORNEYS FEES IS FRIVOLOUS 
IN VIEW OF THE SUPREME COURTS PREVIOUS DENIAL OF 
THE SAME MOTION TO DISMISS 
Vernon E. Bush filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal on February 19, 
1988 in this Court alleging that the matters on appeal were so 
insubstantial as to warrant review, a copy of the motion is appended as 
Exhibit "A". This motion was denied on April 4, 1988 by the Utah Supreme 
Court, a copy of the denial is attached as Exhibit "B". Vernon E. Bush's 
claim for attorney's fees is therefore moot, and should summarily be 
denied. 
CONCLUSION 
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As outlined in appellant's brief, the personal judgment against 
Richard C. Bennion should be set aside as there was no evidence that he 
acted in an individual capacity to be personally responsible for the Bush 
architectural services. Nor was there any writing upon which Commerce 
Properties, Inc. can be held responsible for the customized PIC drawings, 
and engineering prepared for John A. Hall, and Process Instruments & 
Control, Inc. In the event liability for the architectural drawings and 
engineering services is imposed against appellants under the facts of this 
case, liability should be reduced and apportioned to reflect appellants' 
contingent 10% interest in the venture. Alternatively, appellants should be 
entitled to judgment against defendants and respondents Hall and PIC for 
90% reimbursement of any amounts they are required to pay. 
Dated this 2Q *~ day of September, 1988. 
Marcus G. Theodore 
Attorney for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of appellant's, 
Commerce Properties, Inc.'s and Richard C. Bennion's, Reply Brief to the 
following this -zdTU- day of September, 1988: 
John L. McCoy Peter N. Ennenga 
310 South Main Street 1225 East Ft. Union Blvd. #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8o4IOI Midvale, Utah 84117 
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EXHIBIT "A' 
JOHN L. MCCOY (2164) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
310 S.. Main Street #1309 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 355-6400 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS IN AND FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
VERNON E. BUSH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
COMMERCE PROPERTIES, INC., a ] 
corporation, RICHARD C. BENNION, ' 
PROCESS INSTRUMENTS & CONTROL, 
INC., and JOHN A. HALL, 
Defendants. 
1 MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL 
1 Case No. CA-88-0093 
The plaintiff-respondent, Vernon E. Bush, hereby moves 
this Court for an Order dismissing the Appeal filed herein on the 
following grounds and reasons: 
1. The decision appealed from, a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A, is a civil District Court decision, 
and no appeal from such a decision is provided to this Court in 
§78-2a-3(2), a copy of which is also attached hereto. 
2. No Cost Bond was filed at the time of filing the 
Notice of Appeal as required by Rule 6, R* Ut. Ct. App. 
3. No request for a transcript has been filed within 
ten (10) days from the filing of the Notice of Appeal as required 
by Rule 11, R. ut. Ct. App. 
4. No Docketing Statement has been filed within 21 
days of the filing of the Notice of Appeal as required by Rule 9, 
R. Ut. Cte App. 
5. As to the judgment granted against the appealing 
defendant in favor of the plaintiff, all of the evidence at trial 
indisputably showed that the defendant, Richard C. Bennion, 
requested the plaintiff to perform architectural services, the 
plaintiff did perform architectural services upon a project from 
which said defendant would benefit, the appellant was billed 
without protest for said services and used the work product 
produced by said defendant to bid said building project thus the 
grounds for review are so insubstantial as to not merit further 
consideration by this Court. 
DATED this 19th day of February, 1988. 
Attorney f <jfr5J}Aaintif f-Respondent 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
/ 
I hereby certify that 1 mailed a copy of the Motion to 
Dismiss Appeal to Peter Ennenga, attorney for PIC and John Hall, 
1225 E. Ft. Union Blvd. #200, Midvale, Utah 84117, and to Marcus 
Theodore, attorney for defendants-Bennion and Commerce, 275 E. 
South Temple #303, Salt Lake City, Utah 8^111, by U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, thisl9th day of February^^s988. J^ I 
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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH EXHIBIT UB" 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
April 4, 1988 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Marcus G. Theodore 
Attorney at Law 
275 East South Temple, Suite 303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Respondent's Motion to 
Dismiss Appeal 
Vernon E. Bush, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. No. 880100 
Commerce Properties, Inc, a 
corporation, Richard C. Bennion. 
Process Instruments & Control, Inc., 
and John A. Hall, 
Defendants and Appellants• 
THIS DAY, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal is denied. 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
